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Abstract 
 
Purpose – This study investigates the extent international and domestic guidelines have 
influenced the content of corporate environmental reporting in the context of China’s radical 
institutional transition from bureaucratic secrecy to openness, marked by the first nationwide 
guidelines on Open Government Information (OGI) and Open Environment Information 
(OEI), effective in 2008.  
 
Design - The study develops a research instrument that captures international and Chinese 
national guidelines pertaining to environmental information disclosure. This instrument is 
used to analyse 471 reports of leading 100 listed Chinese companies for the critical period 
between 2006 and 2010. Chi-square test statistics are used to analyse the significance of 
differences in reporting items supported by Chinese guidelines versus those supported by 
international reporting guidelines only.  
 
Findings – Partial convergence in climate-change reporting co-exists with divergent China 
specific interpretation of climate change. The coercive institutional influences of the Chinese 
government’s guidance in OGI and OEI led to the rapid growth of CER in 2008 compared to 
2006, despite compliance being voluntary.  
 
Originality/value – The study is innovative in explicitly measuring any changes in reporting 
relative to the potential for additional reporting. Such a method more accurately evaluates the 
effect of institutional influences on reporting. The study provides a fresh profile of the 
content and the reporting medium of CER, with a particular focus on climate change in the 
Chinese context. The findings highlight research into CER based on annual reports risks 
results being incomplete and misleading. Findings have practical implications for policy 
makers in other emerging economies. 
 
Keywords: China; corporate climate-change reporting; developing country; institutional 
context; international; national  
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1. Introduction 
Studies of corporate environmental reporting (CER) in developing countries, such as 
Bangladesh (Belal and Owen, 2007), South Africa (de Villiers and van Staden, 2006), and 
Lebanon (Jamali and Neville, 2011) reveal consistently that CER is subject to a country’s 
political and economic context. This is despite the increasing global diffusion and 
harmonisation of reporting guidelines and practices. Hence, caution must be exercised when 
applying international reporting guidelines for CER to developing countries (Belal and Owen, 
2007).  
China, as the world’s largest developing country, largest carbon emitter, and the second 
largest economy (after the United States), is playing an important role in global climate-
change adaptation and mitigation. However, unlike other developing countries, China has a 
strong administrative capacity to formulate policies (e.g., on climate change) that are adapted 
especially to local conditions (Hubbard, 2008). China is a one-party state, in which the ruling 
Communist Party of China (CPC) is politically unchallengeable. Its influence on company 
behaviour in China (including with respect to CER) is acknowledged widely (Ezzamel et al., 
2007; Ji et al., 2015; Lin, 2001; Yang et al., 2015). Thus, China’s institutional context offers 
an insightful setting to investigate reporting behaviour (Scott, 2002). With the exception of 
the study by ACCA and GRI (2009), no empirical study has hitherto investigated the content 
of CER with a particular focus on climate change in China. This limitation is addressed in 
this study.  
Before 2007, the lack of Chinese government guidance discouraged Chinese enterprises 
from engaging in CER. However, a study of Chinese CER by Yang et al. (2015, p. 35), 
reported ‘the year 2008 was one of rapid growth of CER reporting’ as the CPC’s policy 
‘shifted from a preference for bureaucratic secrecy to one of openness and information 
transparency.’ This was marked by the Chinese government’s release of Open Government 
Information (OGI) and Open Environment Information (OEI), effective in 2008, and its 
encouragement of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports. While there is significant 
overlap between these guidelines and those commonly used internationally (e.g. GRI) the 
Chinese guidelines tend to be more general. This leads to a substantial number of more 
specific disclosure items in the international guidelines not being mentioned in the Chinese 
guidelines, hereafter referred to as items supported international guidelines only. However, 
there are also disclosure items that are unique to the Chinese context. In this study, the term 
‘supported by Chinese domestic guidelines’ refers to both those instances where support is 
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solely from Chinese domestic guidelines and those instances where Chinese domestic 
guidelines and international guidelines converge (see Section 2.13). 
China’s institutional reform and push for environmental information transparency 
provides a timely opportunity to investigate the content and pattern of climate-change related 
environmental information disclosure. We do so here through a comprehensive analysis of 
such disclosures in Chinese companies’ annual reports and CSR reports. Specifically, this 
study draws on institutional theory to investigate the impact of Chinese domestic guidelines 
(marked by OGI and OEI) on climate-change related environmental reporting in China. The 
following research question is addressed:  
 
To what extent have Chinese guidelines and international guidelines influenced climate-
change reporting by Chinese companies?  
 
The relevance of institutional theory to CER is well documented in organisational study 
literature (e.g. Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995; Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman and Ventresca, 
2002) and accounting literature (e.g. Larrinaga, 2007). Although institutional theory was 
developed in the West, an extensive review of literature on CER in China (see Yang et al., 
2015) reveals it is a suitable framework to analyse Chinese CER. This is because of its ability 
to integrate China’s unique institutional context with the individual circumstances of its 
companies. To date, some studies (such as by Branzei and Vertinsky, 2002; Yang, 2011; 
Zeng et al., 2012) have explicitly taken an institutional perspective when exploring Chinese 
corporate environmental management. However, no empirical study has examined the extent 
to which corporate climate-change related reporting has been influenced by China’s 
institutional transition to information transparency, marked by OGI and OEI. This limitation 
is addressed here. 
From 100 leading listed Chinese companies, 471 reports (annual reports and 
sustainability reports) across ten industries, were examined for the critical period from 2006 
to 2010. We found that items supported by Chinese guidelines have a greater frequency of 
reporting than items supported by international guidelines only in each reporting year. 
However, when looking at the change in reporting, the gap narrowed for the period between 
2008 and 2010, compared to that between 2006 and 2008. Such findings suggest partial 
convergence in climate-change reporting coexists with divergent specific interpretations of 
climate-change reporting by Chinese authorities. 
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This study extends the application of institutional theory to the analysis of CER in a 
developing country, specifically China. The study responds to the call by Scott (2002) and 
Yang et al. (2015) to examine studies on Chinese companies’ behaviour (of which climate-
change reporting is a part), informed by institutional theory. The study is among the first to 
use institutional theory to empirically examine the impact of institutional influences 
(domestic guidelines versus international guidelines) on changes in corporate disclosure of 
climate-change related environmental information over time. The empirical analysis 
conducted is innovative in explicitly recognising the corporate environmental information 
that has already been reported by companies, and in measuring any change in reporting 
relative to the potential for additional reporting. Such a method helps to evaluate the effect of 
institutional influences on corporate reporting more accurately. The findings strongly support 
the use of an institutional analytic framework to explain the convergence and the divergence 
in Chinese companies’ responses to global and national institutional influences. 
The study promotes a better understanding of specific institutional contexts companies 
face in dealing with climate-change issues. The study provides a fresh profile of the content 
and the reporting medium of CER, with a particular focus on climate change in the Chinese 
institutional context. The sample analysed is larger, richer (combined analysis of annual 
reports (AR) and (CSR) reports), and more current (including data for reporting year 2010) 
than previous studies on the climate-change reporting of Chinese companies by ACCA and 
GRI (2009). The findings of this study differ from that of ACCA and GRI (2009), which 
reported that the influence of country-level regulations and social pressures to levels of 
climate-change reporting was not related. This has two possible explanations, arising from 
the sample selection and research instrument. ACCA and GRI’s study (2009) was drawn 
from nine CSR reports by Chinese companies in environmentally sensitive industries. The 
sample in this study was drawn from multiple industries, comprising 471 ARs and CSRs. 
ACCA and GRI (2009) used international reporting guidelines (GRI) to analyse the content 
of climate-change reporting practice. This study draws on a combined analysis of 
international and Chinese domestic guidelines on environmental reporting. Hence, unlike the 
report in ACCA and GRI (2009), the Chinese country-specific reporting environment has 
been captured in the research instrument and has been found to be a significant factor.  
The study presents fresh findings on emerging trends in climate-change related 
environmental reporting by Chinese companies (e.g. assurance of CER reporting, the shift 
from using AR to CSR on climate-change reporting; source of income of climate-change 
activities). It highlights the probability that research findings based on sample data drawn 
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from AR only will be incomplete and misleading. The empirical approach including the 
research instrument developed should be useful for future researchers keen to investigate 
CER in China. This study also helps to inform policy makers in other developing countries 
who are wishing to develop CER (including climate-change) policies customised to their 
country’s context.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews institutional 
theory and develops hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research method, Section 4 reports the 
results, and Section 5 discusses the results and concludes the study.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Institutional theory explains that a firm’s actions are a result of a choice among ‘a 
narrowly defined set of legitimate options’ determined by institutional constituents/actors (e.g. 
government, market, regulators, industry associations, customers) comprising a firm’s 
‘organisational field’ of CER (Hoffman, 1999). The organisational field of climate-change 
reporting is evolving, and highly contextualised. Disparate institutional actors and individual 
companies interact in the field to develop ‘collective’ understanding of matters that are 
important to them (Lee, 2011, p. 287). The collective understanding shapes institutional logic 
in the field and influences the content of climate-change reporting. However, collective 
understanding is not necessarily unitary or coherent: organizations often confront multiple 
conflicting institutional pressures that bound the ability of organizations to conform (Oliver, 
1991, p. 162).  
Institutional theory examines external institutional pressures (including domestic and 
international) that lie beyond organisational boundaries, in social processes, and pressures for 
conformity that shape organizations’ actions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1997). 
Institutional pressures are composed of coercive (regulative), normative and mimetic 
(cognitive) elements. Coercive institutions result from formal and informal pressures exerted 
on organizations by other organizations, upon which they are dependent, and by cultural 
expectations in the society (both domestic and global) within which organizations operate 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.150). Coercive institutions engage in rule-setting, monitoring, 
and sanctioning activities (Scott, 2002, p. 61). In the Chinese context, the CPC exercises 
coercive power through its control of the allocation of human and material resources; and 
through conferring legitimacy to Chinese companies. CPC leaders (an elite) can define 
appropriate organization structures and policy by changing political ideologies. The 
‘Scientific Approach to Development’ (see Mohanty, 2003) has been cited as the guiding 
6 
 
ideology in China’s significant domestic and international policy developments on climate-
change, which created new institutions related to climate-change reporting. CPC’s political 
ideology sets the premises, and defines the norms, of reporting by Chinese companies. 
Normative institutions rely on mutually enforced prescriptions, obligations, and 
expectations (Scott, 2002, p. 61). They generally take the form of rules-of-thumb, standard 
operating procedures, occupational standards, and educational curricula. Organizations 
comply with them out of moral/ethical obligation or in conformance to norms established by 
universities, professional training institutions, and trade associations (Hoffman, 1999, p. 352).  
In China, many senior managers in large Chinese companies are former government officers, 
appointed by the CPC (Yang, et al., 2015, p. 32). Senior management who have affiliation 
with CPC membership are subject to the ongoing political screening of CPC party 
organisations. They must demonstrate their political loyalty and professional capability to 
maintain their management elite positions (Bian et al., 2001). They share a common history 
of developing their values and beliefs, and share an ongoing reinforcement of those values 
and beliefs through regular party members meeting, CPC party school training, and 
performance appraisal in the party organisations. 
Mimetic (or cultural cognitive) aspects of institutions embody symbols—words, signs, 
and gestures—as well as cultural rules and frameworks. These guide understanding of the 
nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is developed (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). Organizations will often abide by them without conscious thought. Mimetic 
institutional aspects form a culturally supported and conceptually correct basis of legitimacy 
that becomes unquestioned (Hoffman, 1999, p. 353). For example, since China’s economic 
reform, modelling corporate behaviour on international business practice has become 
expected practice (Chen et al., 2007). Not following the legitimised course of action is likely 
to result in being perceived as less responsive or less effective. International consulting firms, 
global industry trade associations, supranational organizations, and global multinational 
companies explicitly diffuse reporting models across countries.  
Organisations demonstrate structural and procedural isomorphism by responding to 
coercion, expectations of norms and imitation. Isomorphism is defined as ‘a constraining 
process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.149). The constraining process 
reflects the adaptation of an institutional practice by the organisation, in order to promote the 
survival and success of the organisation. However, a wide variety of institutional actors exert 
convergent and divergent institutional pressures on organisations in the organisational field. 
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This enables organisations to exercise agency and choice according to the organisations’ 
circumstances (Levy and Rothenberg, 2002; Levy and Kolk, 2002; Oliver, 1991). For 
example, the study by Smith (2011) finds that factors characterise an organisation (e.g. for-
profit versus not-for-profit, domestic versus global operation) result in different 
organisation’s strategic response to corporate social responsibility. Thus, institutional theory 
accommodates firm-level agency interests in explaining the variations and changes in 
organisational responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2008). 
To gain a better understanding of the organisational field, the following subsection 2.1 
analyses the institutional context of corporate climate-change related environmental reporting 
in China.  
 
2.1 Institutional analysis of climate-change reporting in China 
2.11 China’s policy response to climate change 
China’s international policy response to global climate change is linked closely to its 
domestic economic policies. These have focused strategies on adjusting the pattern of 
economic development and energy efficiency (China National Development and Reform 
Commission, hereafter NDRC, 2007). China signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. It became 
operative in China on 16 February 2005. In 2006, the central-state government set the first 
binding target to reduce energy consumption by 20 per cent and emissions by 15 per cent by 
2010 (base year 2005) in its 11th Five-Year (2006–2010) National Social and Economic 
Development Program. In 2009, China announced its intent to cut emissions by 40 to 45 per 
cent by 2020. ‘Energy Saving and Emission Reduction’ became a slogan in government 
policy announcements on climate change issues. To achieve the set target, the Chinese 
government strengthened coercive pressures on companies and local governments. Business 
enterprises were required to account for energy usage and emissions and were subjected to 
regular audits of their progress in meeting set targets. Chinese large energy users were forced 
to sign contracts with the central government to improve energy efficiency, known as ‘One 
Thousand Business Enterprises’ Energy Saving Actions’ (NDRC, 2006). 
The ‘National Plan on China’s Response to Climate Change’, published in 2007 by the 
NDRC (hereafter, the 2007 National Plan), stated that China’s climate-change policy would 
give full effect to the CPC’s political ideology of ‘Scientific Approach of Development’, 
promote the construction of a ‘socialist harmonious society’, advance the fundamental 
national policy of resource conservation and environmental protection, control greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions and enhance sustainable development capacity. The 2007 National Plan 
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outlined the principles guiding China’s response to climate change. They included: operating 
in the global conceptual framework of sustainable development; taking common but 
differentiated responsibilities of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change; emphasising mitigation and adaptation equally; relying on the advancement and 
innovation of science and technology; and participating in international cooperation actively 
and extensively (NDRC, 2007, p. 26). The majority of the policies and programs in the 2007 
National Plan, and progress reports released annually from 2008 by the NDRC, refer to the 
direction of China’s economic development in adapting to and mitigating climate change. 
Although climate change was not mentioned explicitly in China’s domestic economic and 
environment policies, key domestic policies include those on energy saving and emission 
reduction, renewable energy, and environmental transparency. They promoted sustainable 
economic growth and reductions in GHG emissions (Lewis, 2007).  
 
2.12 Increased domestic institutional pressures on CER in China 
In response to growing domestic discontent with corruption and environmental pollution, 
the China State Council (2005) announced “Decisions on Implementing the ‘Scientific 
Approach to Development’ and Strengthening Environmental Protection” (hereafter, State 
Council Decision 2005). For the first time, environmental protection was placed high on the 
CPC’s agenda. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) issued voluntary social responsibility 
reporting guidelines (including environmental reporting) in late 2006 (hereafter, the SZSE 
Guide 2006). The SZSE Guide 2006 drew strongly on the CPC’s political ideology explicitly, 
as its guiding principle. Its intent was to model international best practice in corporate 
reporting.  
The new institutional requirement for Chinese companies to report environmental 
information was affirmed by the central-state government’s issuance of the first nationwide 
OGI in April 2007. High level central political support for information transparency has 
stimulated the implementation of the policy. China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection 
was the first to implement OGI. Just days after the release of OGI, it issued OEI, China’s first 
nationwide guidance on corporate environmental information disclosure. The measures 
specified in OEI were modelled closely on OGI, but the class of information made available 
was adapted for an environmental context (Finamore, 2010). In the same year, the China 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission also issued guidance to 
central SOEs to fulfil their social responsibility (SASAC 2007). This document encouraged 
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central SOEs to report environmental information. In May 2008, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) issued guidelines on corporate social responsibility reporting for its listed 
companies (SSE 2008). SSE 2008 mirrored OEI on environmental reporting. In December 
2009, the China Social Science Academy (a leading research institute funded by the Chinese 
government) published Chinese CSR guidelines (CASS 2010). This contained disclosure 
measures (including environmental information) that were similar to the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) guidelines for sustainability reporting (G3).  
Thus, between late 2006 and 2010, the Chinese central government, together with 
mainland stock exchanges and industry associations, exerted convergent institutional 
influences on Chinese companies regarding environmental disclosure through CSR reporting 
(see Table 1). In general, these guidelines were consistent with international guidelines on 
CER including climate change (although frequently less specific). However, there were some 
divergent measures for specific environmental information disclosures. This leads to the 
following analysis of the convergence and divergence between global guidelines and Chinese 
guidelines on environmental information disclosure pertaining to climate-change. 
 
2.13 Convergence versus divergence between international guidelines and Chinese 
guidelines 
International guidelines and Chinese domestic guidelines can diverge or converge, 
depending on the specific reporting item. Table 2 summarises the commonalities 
(convergence) and differences (divergence). It shows the supporting international reporting 
guidelines and the Chinese domestic reporting guidelines for corporate climate-change 
related environmental information disclosure.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The sources for developing Table 2 (the research instrument to be used for content 
analysis in this study) incorporate international studies, environmental and climate-change 
related reporting guidelines (World Resources Institute and the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, 2004; Global Reporting Initiative (G3), 2006; Global Compact, 
2011; KPMG and GRI, 2007; Carbon Disclosure Project, 2009; ACCA and GRI, 2009) and 
China’s domestic guidelines on environmental reporting (see Table 1).  
The research instrument comprises 38 individual disclosure items, grouped into the six 
categories of general disclosure shown in Table 2: policy; governance and strategy; financial 
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implications and other risks and/or opportunities; performance and targets; climate change 
mitigation; and adaptation and credibility. Table 2 documents the link between the disclosure 
items and Chinese guidelines (CN) and international guidelines (INT). The table shows that 
the instrument has three items that align with Chinese guidelines only, 16 items that align 
with both Chinese and international guidelines, and 19 items that align with international 
guidelines only.  
The ‘policy’ disclosure category relates to environmental policies that define an 
organisation’s overall commitment to the compliance, operation (including energy and 
materials), product impact and approach to binding targets. Content analysis of key Chinese 
reporting guidelines reveals the CPC’s political ideology of a ‘Scientific approach to 
development’ is the driving force behind the release of these documents. The Chinese 
government’s response to climate change is related closely to its economic policies and 
‘energy saving and emissions reduction’ campaigns. Chinese domestic environmental 
reporting guidelines do not mention climate change explicitly.  
The ‘governance and strategy’ disclosure category is concerned with how companies 
manage information disclosure on climate change (or energy saving and emission reduction 
also covers whether the organisation has explained how climate change trends are aligned 
and integrated with future business strategies (ACCA and GRI, 2009). Unlike international 
reporting guidelines, which suggest reporting specific information in this category, Chinese 
guidelines do not explicitly mention anything in this category. An exception is a brief 
statement in SZSE 2006 (Art. 27) that companies should appoint staff to be responsible for 
environmental protection and provide resources to support those staff. However, the OEI 
encourages Chinese enterprises to disclose environmental information voluntarily, as is 
appropriate to the enterprise. In addition, Chinese listed companies are required to provide 
information about general corporate governance and strategy in their annual financial reports. 
With increased Chinese government regulations on environmental protection, some 
disclosure in this category is expected.  
The ‘financial implications and other risks and/or opportunities’ disclosure category is 
concerned with the risks and/or opportunities associated with climate change. It covers 
physical risks (e.g. extreme weather and storms) and regulatory risks (e.g. increased 
compliance costs due to the impact of new government regulations). Also included are 
opportunities to provide products using new technologies, or services to address climate 
change, potential competitive advantages created by regulatory or technological changes 
linked to climate change, income specifically related to environmental protection, and carbon 
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emissions trading. Except for recommended voluntary reporting of regulatory risks associated 
with new government environmental regulations, Chinese domestic guidelines do not 
explicitly mention physical risks and opportunities associated with climate change. 
The ‘performance and targets’ disclosure category is concerned with company energy 
consumption and emissions, targets to reduce energy consumption and emissions, the results 
of proactivity to improve energy-efficiency and emissions reduction, and the fines or 
sanctions for non-compliance. Except for a general statement on environmental performance 
and targets (including energy saving and emissions reduction), Chinese domestic reporting 
guidelines do not distinguish energy consumption based on source, and direct or indirect 
consumption, as do international reporting guidelines.  
The ‘mitigation and adaptation’ disclosure category is concerned with actions a company 
has taken to deal with climate change. China’s National Plan 2007 points out that for 
developing countries ‘mitigation is a long and arduous challenge while adaptation to climate 
change is a more present and imminent task’ and ‘China will strengthen its policy guidance 
for energy conservation and energy structure optimization to make efforts to control its 
greenhouse gas emissions’ (p. 26). China’s policy statement on mitigation and adaptation to 
climate change indicates (while recognising mitigation actions are essential to cope with 
climate change) that China’s response to climate change aligns with adaptation rather than 
mitigation. Practical measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change in China are effected 
through implementation of national social and economic policies, with particular focus on 
energy efficiency and emissions reduction. China’s domestic policy emphasizes innovation 
and technology (including investment in research and development in environmental 
technologies and product innovation; and education and training) in the campaign for energy 
efficiency and emission reduction. Hence, mitigation and adaptation actions are grouped into 
one category as in ACCA and GRI (2009). Except for items 29 and 32, which are aligned 
more with international reporting guidelines, other specific reporting items under this 
category are convergent between the Chinese domestic reporting guidelines and the 
international guidelines. 
The ‘credibility’ disclosure category is concerned with the integrity and credibility of a 
company’s reporting. There is no specific guidance on the credibility of environmental 
reporting in Chinese domestic guidelines. This contrasts with the international guidelines (e.g. 
GRI 2006) which suggest disclosure of the details of independent assurance of reporting and 
whether national or international reporting guidelines are used. However, Chinese domestic 
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guidelines do encourage companies to report awards received for environmental protection 
and pollution control activities voluntarily (e.g. in SSE 2008).  
 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
 Institutional theorists argue that the coercive, normative and mimetic aspects of 
institutions are integrated and difficult to distinguish empirically, however each of these 
aspects can be more influential than others at certain points in time (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 
2008; Unerman and Bennett, 2004). Coercive institutions are more powerful than other 
institutions in the early stage of defining institutional logic in an organisational field. They 
force organisations to conform to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). New forms of debate 
(e.g. environmental information transparency in China) emerge in the wake of triggering 
events (e.g. OGI and OEI) that reconfigure field membership and/or interaction patterns 
(Hoffman, 1999). The increased coercive pressures exerted by politically and economically 
powerful stakeholders stimulate normative and mimetic institutional pressures on a firm. 
Therefore, they result ‘both in many companies adopting similar stakeholder dialogue 
procedures, and the standard gradually increasing for so long as managers of these companies 
perceive there to be a competitive advantage in being seen to engage in widespread 
stakeholder dialogue’ (Unerman and Bennett, 2004, p. 692). Tauringana and Chithame (2015) 
and Yang et al. (2015) lend strong support to institutional theorists’ view that pressures 
exerted by coercive institutional actors can stimulate converging normative and mimetic 
aspects of institutions in the field of climate-change reporting − especially in the early stage 
of forming new institution (e.g. corporate climate-change reporting). Similarly, Hogan and 
Lodhia (2011) point to the need for regulating corporate carbon emission reporting because 
reporting through regulatory mechanisms (i.e. coercive institutions) has the potential to be 
credible. This helps companies to better ‘manage their reputational risk and portray to 
stakeholders their commitment to environmental responsibility’ (pp. 282 - 283).   
The major coercive institutional pressures were domestic during the period between 
2006 and 2010. The central political commitment of CPC leaders to OGI and OEI has 
influenced policy and practice in Chinese enterprises (Horsley, 2007). They create 
imperatives for Chinese companies to conform to the expectations set by the CPC. The 
increased interest of the CPC and the Chinese government in corporate environmental 
information transparency would affirm the extant normative and mimetic (cognitive) 
institutional influences at international and national levels. Hence, the Chinese guidelines are 
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expected to be more influential than the international guidelines on the change in company 
reporting behaviour.  
Consistent with institutional theory (e.g. Oliver, 1991), when there is a convergent 
interpretation of climate-change related reporting in the international and the national 
guidelines, the propensity to report is expected to even higher. In contrast, when there is a 
divergent interpretation of climate change in the international and national reporting 
guidelines (i.e. reporting items supported by international guidelines only) firms will respond 
strategically to such divergence, by exercising agency and choice. Reporting levels by 
individual Chinese companies can differ due to individual company’s circumstances (e.g. 
company characteristics).  
Given OGI and OEI only became effective since 2008, the above discussion leads to 
the following hypothesis.   
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There will be greater reporting of environmental information disclosure 
supported by Chinese guidelines in 2008 and 2010 than those supported 
by international guidelines only. 
 
A recent empirical study in UK by Tauringana and Chithame (2015) found a coercive 
institutional influence — The UK government’s guidance on corporate climate change 
improving the level of climate-change reporting by UK companies. This suggests that the 
impact of the coercive forces flowing from the triggering event of the Chinese government’s 
introduction of OGI and OEI should have an immediate impact on the shift towards to the 
reporting of items supported by the Chinese guidelines. Consistent with institutional theory, 
when a new institution is formed, the initial impact of the coercive institutional pressures will 
be followed by a lesser impact of the normative and mimetic institutional influences. Hence, 
we expect there will be continued shift towards the reporting of items supported by Chinese 
guidelines in later years, but at a lower rate of change than initially.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Following the implementation of OGI and OEI, there will be greater 
improvement in the reporting of environmental information supported by 
Chinese guidelines than those supported by international guidelines only,  
with the rate of improvement lessening over time.  
 
3. Research method 
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3.1 Data and study period 
Data analysed are the annual reports (AR) and corporate social responsibility reports 
(CSR) of the 100 leading companies across ten industries listed on the China Securities Index 
(CSI) 100 on 30 December 2007 from China’s SSE and SZSE. 471 reports are analysed. 
Standalone CSRs were downloaded from company websites. Table 3 provides a summary of 
reports analysed.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Reports for three significant reporting years were analysed: 2006, 2008 and 2010:  
• 2006 was the beginning year of China’s 11th Five-Year Development Program. At this 
time there were no national level corporate voluntary reporting guidelines. 
• 2008 was the year the Chinese government’s OGI and OEI both became effective. 
• 2010 was two years after the effective implementation of the OGI and OEI. It allows 
sufficient time for Chinese companies to embed national guidelines in their reporting. It 
was also the final year of the 11th Five-Year Development program.  
 
3.2 Empirical analysis 
 The research objective is to examine the extent to which international guidelines and 
domestic guidelines have affected the pattern of Chinese company climate-change reporting. 
We analyse whether there are different frequencies (and/or changes in the frequencies) of 
reporting, of items that were supported by Chinese guidelines, and those supported by 
international guidelines only. Data are grouped into two categories. One is the frequency of 
reporting items supported by Chinese guidelines (CN), and the other is the frequency of 
reporting items supported by international guidelines only (INT). A contingency table 
approach, using a chi-square test, is appropriate for this categorical data analysis 
(Stockburger, 2016).  
Chi-square tests are used to assess the significance of any difference in the frequency of 
reporting items supported by Chinese guidelines and those supported by international 
guidelines only, in 2008 and 2010 (H1). Those tests were used also to assess the significance 
of changes in the frequency of reporting items supported by Chinese guidelines and those 
supported by international guidelines only over time (H2).  
The commonly used approach (e.g. KPMG and GRI, 2007) to measure the change in 
reporting over time is to calculate the absolute percentage growth in reporting items over time 
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and to test whether the rates of growth in the reporting items differ significantly over the 
same time periods. Because the potential for growth in reporting differs substantially across 
individual reporting items under different categories, the commonly used approach risks 
severely distorting the analysis. Any category that starts from a low initial base of reporting 
has much greater potential for increase than one that already has a relatively higher level of 
initial reporting. To recognise this, the relative change in the reporting compared to the 
potential for further growth in reporting is the key measure. To analyse the relative change in 
the frequency of reporting of items supported by Chinese guidelines versus those supported 
by international reporting guidelines only, it is important to recognise how many items are 
being reported already, or conversely, to assess the potential for further reporting. Any 
change in reporting should be measured relative to the potential for additional reporting, to 
avoid distorting the analysis.  
The following definitions recognise that the potential to increase reporting is given by 
the maximum possible number of items that could be reported minus the number already 
being reported. This yields the relationships below: 
 
INTt: items reported in time period t that are supported by international reporting 
guidelines only 
 
MINTt: the maximum number of items that could have been reported in time period t that 
are supported by international reporting guidelines only. 
 
∆INTt, t+1: the percentage change between periods t and t+1 in the number of items 
reported that are supported by international reporting guidelines only, relative to the 
maximum possible change that could have occurred between periods t and t+1in the 
same set of items  
 
CNt : items reported in time period t that are supported by Chinese reporting guidelines 
 
MCNt: the maximum number of items that could have been reported in time period t 
supported by Chinese reporting guidelines 
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∆CN t, t+1: the percentage change between periods t and t+1 in the number of items 
reported that are supported by Chinese guidelines relative to the maximum possible 
change that could have occurred between periods t and t+1in the same set of items. 
 
∆INT t, t+1 = (INTt+1 - INTt)/(MINTt+1 - INTt)*100 
 
∆CNt, t+1 = (CNt+1 - CNt)/(MCNt+1- CNt)*100 
 
Additionally, the absolute percentage growth in each category over time was used to 
measure the impact of institutional influences over time. This analysis investigated whether 
the results are altered (or distorted) in the absence of adjustment to the potential for increase 
in reporting. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Change in reporting content over time 
Content analysis reveals a distinctive Chinese environment of climate-change reporting in 
categories of policy, governance and strategy, financial implications and other 
risks/opportunities, performance and targets, mitigation and adaptation, and credibility. Table 
4 summarises the changes in overall and in category disclosure over time. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 shows that the general disclosure category, Policy, has the highest disclosure 
incidence across each of the three observation years. This is followed by Mitigation and 
Adaptation, Credibility, Performance and Targets, Governance and Strategy. The lowest 
disclosure is for Financial Implications and Other Risks/Opportunities. In general, this 
reporting pattern is consistent with international studies on corporate climate-change 
reporting (ACCA and GRI, 2009; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; KPMG and GRI, 2007).  
A closer examination of the specific disclosure items in each general category shows 
signs of both convergence and divergence with international climate-change reporting 
practice across years, and across companies, in any given year. Nonetheless, results reflect 
climate-change reporting in China’s country-specific reporting context. Table 5 presents the 
findings of individual reporting items disclosed by AR only, CSR only, and both AR and 
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CSR (hereafter AC). This enhances the understanding of changes in reporting in each 
category by disclosure medium over time.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
4.2 Influence of international guidelines versus Chinese guidelines on reporting 
Table 6 summarises the explicit mentions of reporting guidelines (i.e. research instrument 
item 37) by the sample companies 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Table 7 presents the reporting frequency, and the change in potential additional climate-
change reporting items, supported by international guidelines only (INT, n=19) and Chinese 
guidelines (CN, n=19) between 2006 and 2010.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Table 7 shows that the maximum number of possible reporting items in any year, is the same 
in the two categories. However, in descriptive terms, there is a greater level of actual 
reporting of items supported by Chinese guidelines than by items supported only by 
international guidelines. In terms of the reporting over the time period, the data show a large 
jump in reporting between 2006 and 2008. This is much higher in items supported by Chinese 
guidelines (48%) than items supported only by international guidelines (21%) when adjusted 
for the potential for increases. There is a lower level of increase between 2008 and 2010 (15% 
and 6% respectively), but again a similar pattern between the two categories. 
Between the two categories, all reporting levels within each year, and changes between 
years, are statistically different at the 1% level. This allows us to accept that there are 
statistically significant higher levels of reporting of items supported by Chinese guidelines 
than by only international guidelines within each year. We can also accept that the rate of 
increases between the years is higher for items supported by Chinese guidelines. Thus, H1 
and H2 are supported.  
Additional analysis, using an alternative approach to examine the change in the 
frequency of reporting over time (i.e. without adjustment for the potential for increases), 
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reveals a conflicting result. This finding provides support for our argument that any change in 
reporting should be measured relative to the potential for additional reporting.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
5.1 Convergence and divergence in the content of climate-change reporting 
This study strongly supports the greater influence of Chinese country-level reporting 
guidelines compared to international guidelines regarding the content of corporate climate-
change reporting. It supports that the ruling CPC has had a pervasive influence on Chinese 
company reporting behaviour. Findings of the study validate that the strong administrative 
capacity of the Chinese government in dealing with climate-change issues, by means of 
administrative and market mechanisms has pushed Chinese companies to commit to energy 
savings and emissions reduction. The results reveal a strong domestic guideline influence in 
2008, with a further, but lesser additional influence in 2010, following the introduction of 
OGI and OEI. The institutional change of environmental information, marked by the 
implementation of OGI and OEI in China, has stimulated a greater level of reporting of 
climate-change related information mentioned in international guidelines. Where a reporting 
item was specified in Chinese domestic reporting guidelines, the item had a greater level of 
disclosure than if specified in international guidelines only. From 2006 to 2010 there was also 
greater alignment with international guidelines, but not to the same extent as with Chinese 
guidelines. The findings lend support to the proposition that a country’s institutional context 
shapes the content of disclosure (Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011; Holland and Boon Foo, 
2003; Williams, 1999).  
The reporting of the ‘policy’ category corresponds to China’s domestic policy response 
to climate change. There are consistently high levels of reporting of the CPC’s political 
ideology of ‘scientific development’ (item 1), ‘energy saving and emission reduction’ (item 
3), ‘sustainable development’ (item 5), and ‘harmonious society (item 6)’, especially in 
contrast with the lower level of reporting on ‘climate-change or global warming (item 2)’. A 
majority of companies reported a position of support for the Chinese government’s 
environmental policy. They stated that they were committed to binding targets of ‘energy 
saving and emissions reduction’. This is consistent with the high levels of disclosure of item 
3, as opposed to low levels of explicit disclosure of ‘climate change’. This result supports the 
institutional theoretical argument about firm’s strategic response to the divergent pressures 
exerted by the international guidelines and the national guidelines. The Chinese government’s 
domestic policy response to climate change was to implement a national policy of ‘energy 
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saving and emissions reduction’ and industry restructure.  ‘Climate change’ is not mentioned 
explicitly in environmental reporting guidelines issued by the Chinese government or stock 
exchanges. In the absence of clear guidance from the state on reporting on ‘climate change’, 
many companies chose not to mention ‘climate change’ in their reports. This is because low 
disclosure of the item ‘climate change’ would not pose any immediate threat to legitimacy. 
This finding differs from international studies by KPMG and GRI (2007), and by ACCA and 
GRI (2009). Most international companies surveyed in these studies mentioned ‘climate 
change’ explicitly in their reports, and higher levels of disclosure of executives’ views on 
‘climate change’.  
From 2006 to 2010, there was a changing pattern of reporting for the category ‘risks and 
opportunities.’ Reporting more about opportunities than about risks associated with ‘energy 
saving and emission reduction’ can be explained, in part, by the incentives provided by the 
Chinese government to Chinese companies, through a designated ‘energy saving and 
emission reduction subsidy’. This is evidenced by consistent growth in reporting of item 18 
(income associated with climate change and environmental protection activities). This 
reporting disclosed that the major source of income is the Chinese government’s ‘energy 
saving and emission reduction subsidy’. This differs from the findings of KPMG and GRI 
(2007) that reported income by Western companies was sourced from savings from 
reductions in energy use and emissions, and from trading carbon credits. This finding 
strongly supports the influence of the different economic institutional environment in which 
Chinese and Western companies operate. It indicates a still-prevailing administrative role for 
the Chinese government as a resource provider for Chinese companies in mitigating and 
adapting to climate change. The findings differ from those in developed countries, where 
market mechanisms are drawn on more than administrative tools in generating income 
associated with environmental protection activities.  
The findings indicate that early movers began to take advantage of the commercial 
benefits arising from the global and Chinese domestic emissions trading markets. Compared 
to reporting in 2006 and 2008, in 2010 there are statistically significant increases in reporting 
of ‘climate change’ (item 2), ‘low carbon economy’ (item 4), ‘information about how 
climate-change trends are linked to future company strategy’ (item 13), ‘income specifically 
related to environmental protection activities’ (item 18), ‘carbon emission trading’ (item 19), 
‘purchase energy from low carbon sources’ (item 32) and ‘renewable energy’ (item 33). 
Reporting of ‘carbon emission trading’ emerges in 2010, despite low levels of reporting of 
this item in 2006 and 2008. This change of reporting indicates the growing international 
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influences on Chinese company reporting behavior, resulting from the rapid 
internationalization of Chinese companies (see Yang et al., 2015). The growing interactions 
between Chinese companies and the international market impel Chinese companies to be 
perceived as legitimate organisations by international stakeholders. Reporting of climate-
change related environmental information (aligned with international reporting guidelines) is 
a means by which Chinese companies establish their legitimacy in international markets. The 
global expansion of Chinese companies will continue in the next decade. Hence, a greater 
alignment of Chinese companies’ climate-change reporting with international guidelines is 
expected in the future.  
A high disclosure level was found in the ‘mitigation and adaptation’ category, where 
most reporting items are common to Chinese national guidelines and international guidelines. 
This is consistent with our theoretical argument that the greatest propensity to report 
coincides with items where Chinese and international guidelines align. High reporting levels 
of information about ‘energy saved and emissions reduced’, ‘mitigation and adaptation 
actions’, ‘awards’, and under reporting of ‘fines or sanctions for non-compliance’, suggest 
companies tend to send positive messages to report recipients. This is consistent with the 
findings of international studies on climate-change reporting based in developed countries 
(ACCA and GRI, 2009; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; KPMG and GRI, 2007). High levels of 
reporting in this area suggest convergent interpretations of climate-change mitigation and 
adaptation actions from institutional constituents at the organisational field increase the 
propensity to report by Chinese companies. It symbolises Chinese companies’ conformance 
with the Chinese government’s domestic policy of climate-change through implementing an 
‘energy saving and emissions reduction’ campaign, as well as meeting international 
stakeholder expectations on climate-change mitigation and adaptation. 
In general, there were lower levels of disclosure in the categories ‘financial implications 
and other risks/opportunities’ and ‘performance and targets’. The low levels of disclosure of 
risks indicate Chinese companies are still uncertain about how to define the risks or the 
consequences of reporting risks. Therefore, they are not yet prepared to recognise the 
potential risks associated with climate change. The low reporting of most information in the 
category ‘performance and targets’, both within China and internationally, suggests the 
technical challenge of accurately measuring quantities of energy use and emissions.  
Although a low level of independent assurance (see Item 36, Table 5) was found, 
reporting of this information increased over time, consistent with the trend in international 
studies. Nonetheless, the percentage of Chinese companies is much lower than international 
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studies: for example, only 12 per cent of the sample companies disclosed external assurance 
of CSR reports in 2008, in contrast to nearly 40% of global companies reporting external 
assurance in 2003 (see O’Dwyer and Owen, 2007). Among the few companies that included 
an external assurance report, there was great disparity with regard to providers of assurance 
and approaches to assurance, consistent with international studies (see O’Dwyer and Owen, 
2007). Some sample companies (e.g. China Citic Bank; Pingan Insurance, and Merchant 
Energy Shipping) used international consulting firms based in China (such as Ernst and 
Young, DNV Certification China, and Lloyd’s Register Quality Assurance) to perform the 
assurance service. International assurance guidelines including AccountAbility’s AA 1000 
assurance standards and ISAE 3000 were used. In contrast, some companies (e.g. China 
Minsheng Banking and Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel) issued a statement by the director of 
the Chinese national business association or a Chinese local journal, WTO Journal, 
commenting on their CSR reports. In these instances, no specific information was given on 
how the assurance was provided. This is the first finding about the assurance of Chinese CSR 
reports. It has implications for future policy development and research. 
 The low levels of reporting in some areas (financial implications of risks associated 
with climate change; quantitative information of targets of energy efficiency and emission 
reduction; and independent assurance of climate-change related environmental reporting) 
require more extensive government guidelines, including further development of general 
financial reporting standards. As Dascalu et al (2010) argued, a ‘sustainable economy’ 
requires a ‘framework for the economic policy based on the ecological principles within the 
global warming context’ (p. 20). In the absence of ‘cost information about climate change’, 
even ‘sophisticated users with expertise in analysing financial statements’ will have problems 
understanding the impact of climate change on company performance (Freedman and Jaggi, 
2005, pp. 228–229).  
 This study highlights the usefulness of applying an institutional theoretical framework 
to examine the convergence versus divergence of corporate climate-change reporting 
behaviour in China (and possibly in other developing countries). Results reveal ‘legitimacy is 
a relative concept; it is relative to the social system in which the entity operates and is time 
and place specific’ (Deegan, 2009, p. 324). To the extent that there is similarity in the 
reporting pattern across companies within each year, and over time, during the three 
observation years, this reflects the convergent institutional influences on Chinese companies. 
To the extent that there is variation in the reporting pattern across companies over time 
during the three observation years, this reflects the changing political and economic 
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environment and divergent institutional interpretations to climate change. Any individual 
company can choose to ‘avoid’ or ‘manipulate’ the content of reporting when there are 
divergent institutions in the organisational field (Oliver, 1991).  
 
5.2 Limitations and directions for future research 
This study draws data from ARs and CSR reports. Future research could extend data 
collection to other reporting media (e.g. websites). Reporting periods after the study period 
(2006 - 2010) could be covered in future research to assess the impact of changes in global 
institutions and the increased international operation of Chinese companies. Despite these 
limitations, this study has made positive theoretical and empirical contributions to climate-
change reporting research in China.  
Findings of this study point to further new research questions: What is the future 
development of corporate climate-change reporting in China and other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) nations? The BRICS nations are becoming more important in 
the global negotiation on climate change. They are facing similar competing priorities to 
develop economy and carbon emission reduction. The fact that developed countries transfer 
their polluting activities towards the BRICS nations (see Biotier, 2012) complicates the 
international negotiation on carbon emission reduction. This is because a substantial amount 
of carbon emissions in BRICS nations are caused by manufacturing products that are 
consumed in the developed countries. A recent report by Liu (2015) shows about 25% of 
China’s carbon emissions are caused by making products exported to the developed countries. 
Therefore, how to fairly share the responsibility of carbon emission reduction between the 
developed countries and the BRICS nations? To what extent climate-change mitigation 
policies currently used by developed countries (e.g. the European Union’s Emission Trading 
Scheme) would be effective in achieving the global carbon emission reduction? How do 
multinational companies (with head-quarters based in the developed countries) report their 
environmental activities in BRICS (and other developing) countries?  
Findings of this study highlight research into CER based on samples drawn from annual 
reports risks results being incomplete and misleading. Future research should investigate how 
can we best integrate ARs and CSR Reports in corporate climate-change reporting? How 
accounting can best assist decision makers in integrating climate-change information with 
conventional financial reporting (see Alewine and Stone, 2013)? 
This study raises the question of how can we ensure the credibility of reporting? Findings 
of the study indicate assurance of the reporting of climate-change related environmental 
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information is in its infancy in China. There is an urgent need for internationally and 
domestically convergent guidelines for assurance providers regarding the measures of 
independent assurance of climate-change related environmental (and CSR) information. At 
present, there are no Chinese national guidelines for such information. Even internationally, 
there are different assurance guidelines with differing approaches to the assurance of 
corporate sustainability reporting. Without compatible international and domestic guidelines 
for information about who should (and how to) perform independent assurance of climate-
change related environmental reporting, the credibility of such reporting will be compromised.  
With China’s growing contribution to the world economy, and the urgent need to 
develop a global solution to climate change involving collective efforts from developed and 
developing countries, future development of international reporting guidelines on corporate 
reporting (including climate-change related environmental information) should engage with 
Chinese companies so that international reporting guidelines can be better adapted to the 
Chinese environmental reporting context.  
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Table 1 Chinese CSR reporting guidelines 
China State Council (2005): Decisions on implementing the scientific approach to developing and 
strengthening environmental protection (the 2005 Decision) 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (2006): Corporate social responsibility guide for companies listed on 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE 2006) 
China Ministry of Environmental Protection (2007): Measures for open environmental information 
disclosure (for trial implementation) (OEI) 
China state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (2007): Guidance on central-
SOEs to fulfil social responsibility (SASAC 2007) 
Shanghai Stock Exchange: Guidelines on voluntary disclosure of corporate social responsibility and 
environmental information (SSE 2008) 
China Social Science Academy (2010): Corporate social responsibility reporting guidelines (CASS 
2010) 
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Table 2 Research instrument 
General Disclosure Item Specific Disclosure CN INT 
Policy 1 Mention of ‘scientific development’ YES NO 
 2 Mention of ‘climate change or global warming’ NO YES 
 3 Mention of ‘energy saving and emissions reduction’ YES YES 
 4 Mention of ‘low carbon economy’ YES YES 
 5 Mention of ‘sustainable development’ YES YES 
 6 Mention of ‘harmonious society’ YES NO 
 7 Policy statement on operations and environmental protection YES YES 
 8 Public position on commitment to binding targets (e.g. 
support the government’s call for emissions reduction and 
energy saving) 
NO YES 
 9 Policy on addressing product impacts NO YES 
Governance and Strategy 10 CEO/Directors articulate views on environmental 
protection, and energy saving and emission reduction 
NO YES 
 11 Existence of a board committee with specific responsibility 
for environmental affairs/energy saving and emission 
reduction 
NO YES 
 12 Remuneration at executive and board level is linked to 
energy saving and emission reduction 
NO YES 
 13 Information about how climate change trends are linked into 
future company strategy 
NO YES 
Financial  14 Risks due to physical changes associated with climate 
change 
NO YES 
Implications and  15 Regulatory risks YES YES 
other risks/opportunities 16 Opportunities to provide new technologies, products or 
services to address challenges related to climate change 
NO YES 
 17 Potential competitive advantage created for the organisation 
by regulatory or other technology changes linked to climate 
change 
NO YES 
 18 Income specifically related to environmental protection 
activities 
NO YES 
 19 Carbon emissions trading NO YES 
Performance and  20 Quantified energy use YES YES 
Targets 21 Quantified GHG  emissions NO YES 
 22 Targets to reduce energy use NO YES 
 23 Targets to reduce emissions efficiency NO YES 
 24 Energy saved and emissions reduction achieved YES YES 
 25 Fines or sanctions for non-compliance  YES YES 
Mitigation and  26 R&D YES YES 
Adaptation 27 Install cleaner/new technologies YES YES 
 28 Education and training YES YES 
 29 External certification of environmental management NO YES 
 30 Energy efficiency measures YES YES 
 31 Product innovation and change YES YES 
 32 Purchase energy from low carbon sources NO YES 
 33 Renewable energy YES YES 
 34 New business model YES YES 
 35 Relocation/restructure  YES YES 
Credibility 36 Independent assurance of disclosure NO YES 
 37 Use of national/international guidelines to report 
environmental performance 
NO YES 
 38 Awards YES NO 
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Table 3 Summary of reports analysed 
 
  
Industry 2006 2008 2010 Total  
 AR CSR AR CSR AR CSR  
Consumer Discretionary 12 1 12 8 12 9 54 
Consumer Staples 7 1 7 3 7 4 29 
Energy 9 2 9 7 9 7 43 
Financial-banking 10 2 10 10 10 10 52 
Financials-non-banking (including real estate, 
insurances and securities) 
9 1 9 6 9 8 42 
Industrial-Transportation 14 0 14 11 14 11 64 
Industrial-Capital Goods 4 1 4 3 4 3 19 
Materials 18 3 18 15 17 15 86 
Utilities (including Telecoms) 14 0 14 12 14 12 66 
Others (including Heath Care and Information 
Technology) 
3 1 3 3 3 3 16 
Total 100 12 100 78 99 82 471 
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Table 4 Change in overall and category disclosure over time 
[Key: ADF: Actual disclosure frequency; % MDF: the percentage of maximum possible disclosure frequency in the category] 
 2006 2008 2010 
Category disclosure ADF % MDF ADF %MDF ADF %MDF 
Policy 177 20% 557 62% 631 71% 
Governance and strategy 19 5% 99 25% 117 30% 
Financial implications and other risks/opportunities  24 4% 79 13% 116 20% 
Performance and targets 21 4% 176 29% 166 28% 
Mitigation and adaptation  79 8% 459 46% 531 54% 
Credibility 19 6% 129 43% 146 49% 
Total disclosure 339 9% 1499 39% 1707 45% 
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Table 5 Change in individual item disclosure over time 
 
[Key: Cat1= Policy; Cat2=Governance and Strategy; Cat3= Financial implications and other risks and opportunities; 
Cat4=Performance and targets; Cat5=Mitigation and adaptation; Cat6=Credibility; %] 
 
 2006 (n=100) 2008 (n=100) 2010 (n=99) 
AR 
only 
CSR 
only 
AC Overall AR 
only 
CSR 
only 
AC Overall AR 
only 
CSR 
only 
AC Overall 
Cat 1             
1 25 4 3 32 18 15 41 74 22 16 33 71 
2 1 3 0 4 2 5 8 15 3 25 2 30 
3 18 5 4 27 16 13 62 91 12 22 57 91 
4 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 4 9 26 31 66 
5 31 1 7 39 17 10 66 93 12 15 61 88 
6 19 2 9 30 7 20 55 82 3 45 32 80 
7 9 6 2 17 4 22 51 77 4 39 38 81 
8 13 7 3 23 8 16 53 77 7 39 37 83 
9 0 3 1 4 4 7 33 44 1 25 15 41 
Cat 2             
10 6 3 1 10 9 9 33 51 8 24 20 52 
11 1 4 1 6 4 8 15 27 1 16 7 24 
12 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 6 0 1 3 4 
13 1 2 0 3 2 4 9 15 7 22 8 37 
Cat 3             
14 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 6 3 2 0 5 
15 10 0 0 10 13 0 3 16 16 1 2 19 
16 0 0 0 0 4 3 7 14 6 10 6 22 
17 4 0 0 4 3 3 2 8 0 6 4 10 
18 3 5 0 8 13 2 16 31 21 11 17 49 
19 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 4 1 8 2 11 
Cat 4             
20 0 3 1 4 1 13 25 39 0 29 8 37 
21 0 4 0 4 0 6 21 27 0 20 6 26 
22 0 1 1 2 2 7 15 24 1 17 2 20 
23 0 1 1 2 1 6 14 21 0 12 2 14 
24 2 5 2 9 6 19 39 64 3 41 25 69 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Cat 5             
26 8 5 2 15 7 2 39 58 6 20 46 72 
27 8 5 3 16 9 14 54 77 7 39 36 82 
28 1 4 0 5 3 55 1 59 2 42 21 65 
29 2 4 1 7 1 8 18 27 2 23 5 30 
30 3 5 2 10 6 18 53 77 6 37 42 85 
31 0 5 0 5 3 12 40 55 2 32 19 53 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 10 4 15 
33 0 3 0 3 0 4 22 26 4 18 21 43 
34 7 7 2 16 6 17 44 67 5 32 32 69 
35 1 0 1 2 2 0 10 12 2 8 7 17 
Cat 6             
36 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 12 0 15 0 15 
37 2 2 0 4 1 12 32 45 0 46 6 52 
38 6 5 4 15 5 15 52 72 7 21 51 79 
Total  181 105 53 339 181 353 955 1499 184 815 708 1707 
% 53% 31% 16% 100% 12% 24% 64% 100% 11% 48% 41% 100% 
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Table 6 Reported use of Chinese and international guidelines 
Reported guidelines  
Research instrument Item 37 
2006 2008 2010 
Chinese guidelines (CN)    
        SZSE 1 10 17 
        SSE 0 31 33 
        CASS 0 0 7 
        SASAC 0 2 9 
        CN Others 1 5 14 
        Subtotal CN 2 41 51 
International guidelines (INT)    
        G3 2 22 33 
        Global Compact 1 4 7 
        INT Others 0 1 8 
        Subtotal INT 2 23 34 
Total  4 45 52 
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Table 7 Reporting frequency and change in potential additional climate-change reporting 
[Key: ADF: Actual disclosure frequency; MDF: Maximum possible disclosure frequency] 
 
Year 2006 2008 2010 
 ADF MDF % MDF ADF MDF %MDF ADF MDF %MDF 
International guidelines 
only 84 1900 4% 457 1900 24% 542 1881 29% 
Chinese guidelines 255 1900 13% 1042 1900 55% 1165 1881 62% 
Total 339 3800 9% 1499 3800 39% 1707 3762 45% 
Change % based on 
potential additional 
climate-change reporting 
 
 2006-2008  2008-2010  
INT 
 
 21%  6%  
CN   48%  15%  
c.f. commonly used 
measurement of change % 
based on absolute growth       
INT   444%  19%  
CN   309%  12%  
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